The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) established a laboratory network within the GHSI community to develop their collective surge capacity for radionuclide bioassay in response to a radiological or nuclear emergency. A recent exercise was conducted to test the participating laboratories for their capabilities in screening and in vitro assay of biological samples, performing internal dose assessment and providing advice on medical intervention, if necessary, using a urine sample spiked with a single radionuclide, 241 Am. The laboratories were required to submit their reports according to the exercise schedule and using pre-formatted templates. Generally, the participating laboratories were found to be capable with respect to rapidly screening samples for radionuclide contamination, measuring the radionuclide in the samples, assessing the intake and radiation dose, and providing advice on medical intervention. However, gaps in bioassay measurement and dose assessment have been identified. The network may take steps to ensure that procedures and practices within this network be harmonised and a follow-up exercise be organised on a larger scale, with potential participation of laboratories from the networks coordinated by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Health Organization.
INTRODUCTION
The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is an informal network of countries formed in 2001 to ensure health-sector exchange and coordination of practices in confronting risks to global health posed by chemical, biological and radio-nuclear threats, as well as by pandemic influenza (1) . The member countries/organisations of the GHSI are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the UK, the USA and the European Commission. The World Health Organization (WHO) is a technical advisor. As part of the GHSI partnership, an annual meeting of Health Ministers is held to foster dialogue on topical policy issues and promote collaboration. Other initiatives involving senior health officials as well as policy, technical and scientific personnel take place on a regular basis, focussed on risk management, communications, chemical events, radio-nuclear threats, pandemic influenza and global laboratory cooperation.
The GHSI Rad-Nuc Threats Working Group (RNWG) was created to facilitate sharing and collaboration on policies and capability development to enhance public health preparedness and response to radiological and nuclear threats. As a result of discussions and consultations, the RNWG decided to establish a laboratory network to improve the collective surge capacity for radionuclide bioassay within the GHSI community. Within this network, laboratories can share their expertise through training activities, exercise their preparedness through intercomparisons, develop new capabilities through collaborative R&D and assist in bioassay analysis when multiple laboratories are required following an emergency.
In 2013, the network laboratories were surveyed on their current capabilities in emergency radionuclide bioassay and the technological and operational gaps they had identified in this area. Based on the survey results, an intercomparison exercise was organised in late 2014 to test the participating laboratories for their response capabilities in screening and in vitro assay of biological samples, performing internal dose assessment and providing advice on medical intervention when necessary. Eight laboratories from seven countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA) participated. In addition to testing, the exercise also provided an opportunity for countries to share and compare their policies and practices for assessing internal contamination, and for the network to identify common technological or operational priorities for future collaborative work.
METHODS AND MATERIALS

Exercise design
The exercise was designed to be an intercomparison of emergency capabilities for screening, bioassay, dose assessment and medical advice. While it was somewhat realistic, the scenario was deliberately designed to be manageable by most of the participating laboratories in terms of the required sensitivity for the measurement as well as resource demands (i.e. laboratories were not asked to work overtime).
Based on the consensus of the RNWG, it was decided to exercise the participating laboratories with a urine sample spiked with a single radionuclide that has been identified to be high risk (2 -4) . The following scenario and parameters were chosen or considered: † Acute intake of 241 Am (1.50 MBq) via ingestion by a man with physical characteristics similar to a 'Reference Man' described by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) (5) . † Urine collection started 24 h after the suspected intake and lasted for 24 h. One 100 ml urine sample from this collection would be sent to each laboratory (to mimic a spot sample). † The laboratories were required to report their results at short, predetermined intervals in order to simulate an emergency response. † The level of contamination in the scenario was chosen to accommodate the bioassay capabilities previously demonstrated by some of the participating laboratories (6) , as well as to approach the dose thresholds for medical intervention recommended by national or international authorities (4, 7) . (8) . The spiked urine sample was then divided into 100 ml aliquots; one was sent to each participating laboratory by a commercial carrier. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the messages sent to the participating laboratories and the questions to be addressed in the scheduled reports. 'Message No. 1' was sent out soon after the urine samples were picked up by the commercial carrier along with questions for the laboratories to address when submitting the '6-Hour Report' and the '72-Hour Report'. This message was sent by email to each laboratory individually with a designated confidential lab code provided. Considering the time required for sample delivery and potential delay over the weekend, the laboratories were advised to start the exercise at a convenient time; they were not required to start the exercise at a specific time or immediately after receiving the samples. The '6-Hour Report' and the '72-Hour Report' were required to be submitted no later than 6 and 72 h, respectively, once the exercise started.
Sample preparation and distribution
Scheduled reports
'Message No. 2' was sent by email to each laboratory soon after its '72-Hour Report' was received along with questions for the laboratories to address when submitting the '96-Hour Report'. This message provided essential information for the assessment of intake and radiation dose. The '96-Hour Report' was due in 24 h after receiving 'Message No. 2'.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Response to reporting schedule
Overall, the participating laboratories submitted most of the required reports as scheduled, although the starting time varied from lab to lab due to the difference in the time required for sample delivery and Table 1 . Messages sent to the participating laboratories.
Message No. 1 'A urine sample has been shipped to your lab for screening and bioassay of a radionuclide in it. Once you receive the sample, you may start working at a time convenient to you.' (Sent soon after samples were picked up by the commercial carrier.)
Message No. 2 'The urine sample (100 ml) you received is from a man (70 -80 kg, 170-180 cm) of mid-twenties who was suspected to have had a single intake of the radionuclide through food consumption. Urine collection from this person started 24 h after the suspected intake and lasted for 24 h. The sample you received is a fraction of this 24-hour urine collection.' (Sent immediately after receiving the '72-Hour Report'.) customs clearance, time zone issues and/or a schedule conflict with other work commitments. All laboratories submitted the required '6-Hour Report' on time, indicating that the laboratories are capable of screening samples in a short time period. Three laboratories delayed the submission of the '72-Hour Report' due to either the bioassay method(s) requiring more time or the bioassay work was paused over the weekend. One laboratory slightly delayed the submission of its '96-Hour Report' due to issues related to weekend communication. Lab 003 exited the exercise after submitting its '72-Hour Report'.
Results for '6-Hour Report'
All the participating laboratories reported that the sample was 'radioactive' and provided a brief description for the techniques used for sample screening (Table 3) . Four screening methods/techniques were used by the laboratories, with gamma spectrometry and liquid scintillation counting being the most widely employed. Within a short counting period (2 -3 h), gamma spectrometry would show a small but visible peak at 60 keV, which indicates the possible presence of 241 Am in the sample. Liquid scintillation counting using a small fraction of the sample, with or without alpha/beta discrimination, would indicate above-background radioactivity in the sample and the presence of alpha emitter(s). Gross alpha/beta analysis is a very popular technique for sample screening; however, in this exercise, only Lab 007 used it. Interestingly, inductively coupled plasma mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) was also used for screening (Lab 002 and Lab 005). ICP-MS measurement does not tell if a detected mass is for a radionuclide, but it does indicate the potential presence of the radionuclide Table 3 . Methods/techniques used for sample screening in the participating laboratories.
Lab code Screening techniques 002
Gamma spectrometry (HPGe) showed a small peak of 60 keV; Liquid scintillation counting for gross alpha showed a result slightly above the background; ICP-MS screening showed the possible presence of 241 Am. 003 Gamma emitter(s) indicated using a whole-body counter; No alpha emitters indicated because of small volume of sample. 004
Gamma spectrometry indicated the suspected presence of 241 Am; Liquid scintillation counting for gross alpha/beta confirmed the presence of alpha emitter(s). 005
Gamma spectrometry (HPGe) found several small peaks around 59, 63 and 92 keV with poor counting statistics; ICP-MS analysis found a significant amount of an element with a mass of 88. 006
Gamma spectrometry indicated the presence of 241 Am; Liquid scintillation counting for gross alpha/beta measurement with 1 ml sample showed results less than the detection limit. 007
Gamma spectrometry indicated the presence of 241 Am; Gross alpha/beta analysis (using 20 ml of the sample) gave results of 4.2+0. 4 Gamma spectrometry on the sample (3-h counting) showed a peak at 59.5 keV, characteristic of 241 Am; Liquid scintillation counting for gross alpha/beta measurement with 5 ml sample (2-h counting) indicated the presence of alpha emitter(s) but not beta emitter(s). 009 Gamma spectrometry; Liquid scintillation with alpha/beta discrimination. with such a mass. Lab 003 used a whole-body counter to screen the sample, as the above-mentioned four techniques were not available.
Results for '72-Hour Report'
For the bioassay measurement, diverse methods/techniques for sample treatment, separation, measurement, QA/QC and estimation of uncertainties were used by the participating laboratories (Table 4) . Alpha spectrometry was used by four laboratories (Lab 004, Lab 005, Lab 006, Lab 007) for the measurement of 241 Am in the urine samples following separation using chromatographic methods (solidphase extraction or anion exchange) and electro-deposition. Lab 002 also separated 241 Am from the sample using a chromatographic method but measured it by ICP-MS. Lab 008 and Lab 009 quantified 241 Am in the sample using gross alpha liquid scintillation counting and gamma spectrometry, with a counting time of 17 and 68 h, respectively. The advantages and disadvantages of different methods/techniques for emergency bioassay have been discussed previously (6) ; however, it is worthwhile to note that bioassay methods that deliver results in hours rather than days are always desired for emergency population monitoring and management as early medical interventions, if indicated necessary by bioassay results, help reduce radiation-induced health risks more effectively. Table 5 summarises the bioassay results reported by the participating laboratories with uncertainties at the 95 % confidence interval (CI). As mentioned above, the spiked testing level for 241 Am is 4.3 Bq l 21 . The calculated bias from the reported results in Table 5 falls between 212 and þ19 %, which is well within the acceptable range of 225 to þ50 % recommended by ISO 28218 (10) , an international standard developed for occupational bioassay. Currently, there is no international standard for emergency bioassay available. Lab 005 and Lab 007 reported the measurement results for other radionuclides, although only 241 Am was spiked in the sample. These results indicate potential contamination from impurities in the tracers and chemicals used by the laboratories, or more possibly interferences to the measurements from background radiation depending on the techniques employed. Post-exercise discussion revealed that the reported 241 Pu signal by Lab 007 was actually caused by the presence of 40 K in the urine sample. Pu using alpha spectrometry following ion exchange separation and electrodeposition; Measurement of 90 Sr using liquid scintillation counting following phosphate isolation and extraction chromatography; Measurement of 241 Pu (suspected) using gross beta liquid scintillation counting. 008
Measurement of a sub-sample (5 ml) using gross alpha liquid scintillation counting (17 h); QA/QC: a urine sample from a healthy donor was counted similarly for blank correction. 009
Measurement using gamma spectrometry (HPGe, 68-h counting); GUM (9) for uncertainty estimation. Table 6 summarises the assumptions, methods and tools used by each laboratory when performing the intake and dose assessment. All the laboratories inferred from 'Message No. 2' that the ICRP 'Reference Man' model (5) could be used for intake and dose assessment, while some of the laboratories also recognised the limitation of using it. ICRP biokinetic and dosimetric models were used by all the laboratories, in the form of national or international guidelines or as computerised tools (IMBA, AIDE, MONDAL, DCAL). Some of the laboratories used multiple tools to verify the assessment, which is a very good practice. Table 7 presents the reported intake and the 50 y committed effective dose (CED) from each laboratory. As mentioned above, the exercise was designed starting with an acute intake of 1.50 MBq 241 Am through food ingestion. The calculated 50y CED for a 'Reference Man' is 306 mSv. Table 7 shows that for all but one laboratory, the reported intake of 241 Am and the resulting CED are very close to 1.5 MBq and 306 mSv, respectively, with a bias no more than +20 %. Although the bioassay result reported by Lab 005 (Table 5) is very close to the testing level, the reported intake and dose values are substantially different from the expected values. Post-exercise discussion revealed that this was due to a mistake regarding the date on which the urine sample was collected. The results for intake and the CED obtained from re-calculation (not shown in this article) are quite comparable with those submitted by the other laboratories. Lab 005 and Lab 007 also reported the calculated intake and dose for radionuclides other than 241 Am. As discussed above, these are the results of tracer impurities, contamination or background interference. Table 8 presents the medical advice provided by the participating laboratories. All recommended treatment (immediate or not) with diethylene triamine penta acetate (DTPA) (with or without specified dosage) in reference to a dose threshold recommended by one or more national or international guidance documents. The role of qualified physicians and other factors were also identified by some of the laboratories as important considerations when a decision on treatment needs to be made. Some of the laboratories mentioned the need for further monitoring to evaluate the treatment efficacy. Note that some guidance documents recommend the use of a dose threshold of (4) , while the others recommend the use of 200 mSv (7) .
CONCLUSION
Overall, this mini-exercise demonstrated that the participating laboratories are capable of rapidly screening bioassay samples for radionuclide contamination, measuring the radionuclide in the samples, assessing the intake and radiation dose, and providing advice on medical intervention. However, in some areas, improvements are needed. For example, some methods used in the exercise required more time than is ideal for emergency bioassay, as demonstrated by the delay in submitting the '72-Hour Report' by three laboratories. Rapid bioassay methods are very important for timely delivery of results following an emergency. The RNWG may consider organising a technical workshop to facilitate exchange and learning in the GHSI community, arrange inter-laboratory hands-on training among network laboratories and/or organise another exercise involving a multiple radionuclides scenario. In addition, to ensure the success of this laboratory network, the RNWG may consider developing and formalising emergency response plans and protocols for the activation, coordination, sample shipment and use of this laboratory network. These plans/protocols would supplement the IAEA RANET (Response and Assistance Network) (15) and the WHO REMPAN (Radiation Emergency Medical Preparedness and Assistance Network) (16) and need to be integrated into national emergency preparedness and response plans. Collaborations between this GHSI laboratory network and the RANET and REMPAN networks may be considered in the future.
